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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to expand the range of empirical work 
relevant to the extended cognition debates. First, I trace the 
historical development of the person-situation debate in 
social and personality psychology and the extended cognition 
debate in the philosophy of mind. Next, I highlight some 
instructive similarities between the two and consider possible 
objections to my comparison. I then argue that the resolution 
of the person-situation debate in terms of interactionism 
lends support for an analogously interactionist conception 
of extended cognition. I argue that this interactionism might 
necessitate a shift away from the dominant agent-artifact 
paradigm toward an agent–agent paradigm. If this is right, 
then social and personality psychology—the discipline(s) that 
developed from the person-situation debate—opens a whole 
new range of empirical considerations for extended cognition 
theorists which align with Clark & Chalmers original vision of 
agents themselves as spread into the world.
Introduction
Wagman and Chemero (2014) point out that proponents and opponents of 
extended cognition both agree that the questions about extended cognitive pro-
cesses are empirical ones (p. 105). I concur, and in this paper I will attempt to 
expand the range of empirical work that is relevant to the extended cognition 
debate beyond the usual suspects (e.g., Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao, 1997; 
Brooks, 1991; Kirsh & Maglio, 1994) and into the domain of social and person-
ality psychology.
I will argue that there are instructive similarities between the development of 
the person-situation debate in social and personality psychology and the devel-
opment of the extended cognition debate in the philosophy of mind. The payoff is 
twofold: (1) insofar as my comparison holds, the resolution of the person-situation 
debate can provide (indirect) evidence for the plausibility of certain formulations 
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of extended cognition over others, which will, in turn, (2) open up a new range 
of empirical considerations for extended cognition theorists in social and per-
sonality psychology.
Here’s the plan for the paper: In section 1, I trace the historical development 
of the person-situation debate (section 1.1) and the extended cognition debate 
(section 1.2). In section 2 I highlight some instructive similarities between the 
two (section 2.1) and consider possible objections to my comparison (section 
2.2). In section 3, I explore the implications of the person-situation/extended 
cognition comparison: I argue that if the comparison holds, then the resolution 
of the person-situation debate in terms of interactionism lends support for anal-
ogously interactionist conceptions of extended cognition (section 3.1). I then 
suggest that interactionist conceptions of extended cognition might necessitate a 
shift away from the dominant agent-artifact paradigm toward the kind of agent-
agent paradigm operative, for example, in research on romantic relationships in 
personality psychology (section 3.2).
1. Historical narratives
In this first part of the paper, I trace the historical developments of the person-sit-
uation debate in social and personality psychology (section 1.1) and the extended 
cognition debate in the philosophy of mind (section 1.2). Both traditions are rich 
and varied, and so my telling cannot but be idiosyncratic and selective. My aim 
here is simply to offer a coherent story about the evolution of each tradition. I 
will then go on to identify instructive similarities between these stories (section 
2) and examine what follows from them (section 3).
1.1. The person-situation debate
Many introductory courses and textbooks in social psychology begin with a salu-
tatory reference to Lewin’s (1936/2015) equation: B = f(P,E), where “B” is behavior, 
“P” is the person and “E” is the environment, such that behavior is a function of 
the person and the environment. When written in this way, the comma indicates 
agnosticism on the precise nature of the relationship between person and envi-
ronment. On one reading, the comma separates two independent entities, which 
is to say that the effect of some aspect of personality on behavior is the same 
regardless of the environment or situation (I use “environment” and “situation” 
interchangeably), and the effect of some aspect of the situation on behavior is the 
same regardless of the person. Kihlstrom (2013) notes that this reading charac-
terized traditional approaches in social and personality psychology, and also the 
resulting division in labor in psychology departments in the twentieth century. 
The traditional approaches in personality psychology, Kihlstrom writes, …
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… construed behavior as a function of person attributes such as traits, attitudes, emo-
tions, motives, and values … in such research, the effects of the environment are gener-
ally construed as “noise.” The canonical method of traditional personality psychology 
thus exemplifies the Doctrine of Traits, which may be stated as follows: Social behavior 
varies as a function of internal behavioral dispositions that render it coherent, stable, 
consistent, and predictable. (2013, p. 793)
Traditional approaches in social psychology, on the other hand, …
… construed behavior as a function of differences in the physical and (especially) 
social environment … in such research the effects of individual differences in person-
ality are generally construed as “noise.” This view is captured by what might be called 
the Doctrine of Situationism: Social behavior varies as a function of features of the 
external environment, particularly the social situation, that elicit behavior directly, or 
that communicate social expectations, demands, and incentives. (p. 793)
The debate here is about how to best explain and predict behavior. Proponents 
of the Doctrine of Traits think that personality variables explain more of the var-
iance in behavior, while proponents of the Doctrine of Situationism think that 
environmental variables do more of the explanatory work. It is worth flagging here 
that, when construed in this way, the person-situation debate affords a reading in 
terms of internalism and externalism, respectively. I will return to this point below.
Much psychological research in the twentieth century was conducted along 
these person-situation party lines, where the relationship between partisans 
was described as “benign collegial neglect” (Kihlstrom, 2013, p. 794). That 
changed, however, with the publication of Walter Mischel’s (1968) Personality 
and Assessment, which was received at the time as a devastating critique of per-
sonality psychology. In an oft-quoted passage, Mischel claims:
With the possible exception of intelligence, highly generalized behavioral consistencies 
have not been demonstrated and the concept of personality traits as broad response 
predispositions is thus untenable … The initial assumptions of trait-state theory were 
logical, inherently plausible, and also consistent with common sense and intuitive 
impressions about personality. Their real limitation turned out to be empirical—they 
simply have not been supported adequately. (pp. 146–147)
Another popular soundbite is that in the personality literature reviewed by 
Mischel, the correlation between scores on various personality measures and 
actual behavior was about r = .3, meaning that only 10% of the variance in behav-
ior is explained by personality variables. Setting to the side methodological and 
interpretative qualms with Mischel’s review, Personality and Assessment did turn 
out to be rather devastating to personality psychology at the time. Swann and 
Seyle (2005) show that after the publication of Personality and Assessment, there 
was “a marked decline in the number of research studies, graduate training pro-
grams, and dissertations devoted to personality psychology” (p. 156), and this 
lasted well into the 1970s.
Among others, work by David Funder and colleagues helped to reverse this 
trend. Most notably, Funder and Ozer (1983) showed that once the t and F statistics 
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often reported in social psychological and situationist studies are converted to the 
r statistic often reported in personality and individual difference studies, …
… the effects on behavior of several of the most prominent Situational factors in social 
psychology seem to average slightly less than .40. Moreover, because in most social psy-
chological experiments only two or three levels of the situational independent variable 
are studied, and because these levels usually are deliberately chosen to be quite different 
from each other, situational linear effects such as calculated here quite possibly overes-
timate the true state of affairs. (Funder & Ozer, 1983, p. 110)
In other words, once apples are compared to apples, the predictive and explan-
atory power of the traditional social psychological and situational measures are 
not much different from personality and individual difference measures. Indeed, 
in a meta-analysis of more than 25,000 studies involving 8 million participants, 
Richard, Bond, and Stokes-Zoota (2003) find that the mean effect size for person 
and situation effects are .19 and .22, respectively (p. 337). It seems, then, that, 
situations are no better at explaining behavior than are persons.
Recall that all of the preceding discussion has been based on the assumption 
that the comma in Lewin’s equation signified an additive, or independent relation-
ship between persons and environments. As a matter of contingent historical fact, 
this is how social and personality psychology developed as disciplines, but it is not 
the only way to interpret the relationship between persons and environments. To 
cite just one of many possible contemporary examples, Mischel himself notes, in 
a 40-year retrospective on Personality and Assessment, that the most promising 
approaches in social and personality psychology …
… bridge the classic partitioning most unnatural and destructive to the building of 
a cumulative science of the individual—the one that splits the person apart from the 
situation, treating each as an independent cause of behavior. At the time of the “per-
son versus situation” debate, this splitting (amazingly) threatened to make personal-
ity the discipline that studies people apart from situations, and social psychology the 
unfriendly neighbor that studies situations apart from people. (2009, p. 289)
In other words, the Doctrines of Traits and Situationism, taken independently, 
constitute a false dichotomy. The takeaway is that you can ask any contemporary 
social or personality psychologist about the person/situation debate and they will 
likely tell you that it is over, and has been for some time.
1.2. The extended cognition debate
In the previous section I mentioned that the person-situation debate affords a 
reading on which the Doctrine of Traits might be roughly understood as a form 
of internalism and the Doctrine of Situationism might be roughly understood as 
a form of externalism. In this section, I will tell the other half of the story needed 
to cash out that claim.
It is worthwhile to begin by noting the arbitrariness of marking the genesis of 
extended cognition, as is standard practice in the literature, with the introduction 
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of Inga and Otto. The extended cognition debate, like the person-situation debate, 
has a history with its roots in early twentieth century philosophy and psychology. 
Starting with Otto’s notebook, then, risks ignoring the historical depth of the 
ideas and concepts in the debate. If only in passing here, it is helpful to note that 
the classical American pragmatists were saying things like the following, nearly a 
century before Otto was trying to find the MoMA. John Dewey, for instance, says:
Thinking, or knowledge getting, is far from being the armchair thing it is often sup-
posed to be. The reason it is not an armchair thing is that it is not an event going on 
exclusively within the cortex … Hands and feet, apparatus and appliances of all kinds 
are as much a part of it as changes within the brain. (Dewey, 1916/2004, p. 9)
And C.S. Peirce:
Modern philosophy has never been able to quite shake off the Cartesian idea of the 
mind, as something that “resides,”—such is the term—in the pineal gland. Everybody 
laughs at this nowadays, and yet everybody continues to think of mind in this same 
general way, as something within this person or … belonging to him and correlative to 
the real world. (Peirce, 1903/1998, p. 199)
Indeed, many scholars have noted that the pragmatist cannon is a fruitful but 
underutilized resource for extended cognition theorists (e.g., Chemero, 2011; 
Gallagher, 2014; Madzia, 2013; Rockwell, 2005; Skorburg, 2013; Vaesen, 2014). 
I won’t belabor that point here, but it should hardly be surprising that the same 
school of thinkers who brought the concept of symbolic interactionism to sociol-
ogy and psychology (e.g., Mead, 1934/1962) would play a role in the development 
of the theories of that have come to characterize social psychology and its parallels 
with extended cognition.
While my story begins with the classical pragmatists, like all other accounts 
of the extended mind and cognition, it also runs through Clark and Chalmers’s 
(1998) classic thought experiment, which readers here are no doubt familiar 
with by now.1 But before getting into the thick of the contemporary debates, it is 
worthwhile to mark a distinction at the outset, as the failure to do so has created 
much confusion in the literature. The distinction is between the hypotheses of 
the extended mind (HEM) and of extended cognition (HEC). Pöyhönen (2014), 
Bernecker (2014), and others have noted that the latter is “a claim about cognitive 
processing,” where the former “concerns the location of human mental states,” 
and that crucially, these distinct hypotheses “apply to different domains, address 
largely different issues, and depend on different sources of evidence” (Pöyhönen, 
2014, p. 737). One implication of this distinction is that claims concerning HEC 
are evaluated with respect to the explanatory standards of the sciences of the mind, 
while claims concerning HEM are evaluated with respect to our folk psychological 
intuitions about mentality. Because this paper is ultimately aimed at introducing 
a new body of empirical work to philosophical debates, my positive arguments 
(sections 2 and 3) are primarily pitched at the domain of HEC. But because the 
present section is largely historical in nature, I won’t fret about other authors’ 
equivocation on HEM/HEC.
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In the story I want to tell about the development of extended cognition, the 
relevant trajectory is structured by claims about coupled systems:
In these cases [of extended cognition], the human organism is linked with an external 
entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cogni-
tive system in its own right. All the components in the system play an active causal role, 
and they jointly govern behaviour in the same sort of way that cognition usually does. 
If we remove the external component the system’s behavioural competence will drop, 
just as it would if we removed part of its brain. Our thesis is that this sort of coupled 
process counts equally well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the 
head. (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, pp. 8–9)
The debate about extended cognition became a debate in large part due to Adams 
and Aizawa (2008, 2009, 2010), and in particular, their formulation of the cou-
pling-constitution fallacy, which has also long since been familiar to readers.2 The 
charge has nonetheless been a persistent thorn in the side of extended mind and 
cognition theorists, and it leads to a more general worry: without principled crite-
ria for distinguishing mere coupling from full-blown constitution with respect to 
cognitive processes or mental states, we might be led to what Rowlands describes 
as the problem of cognitive bloat:
Once we permit such processes, where do we stop? Our conception of the cognitive 
will become too permissive, and we will be forced to admit into the category of the 
cognitive all sort sorts of structures and processes that clearly are not cognitive. (2013, 
p. 86).
What’s important for my purposes is that the coupling-constitution fallacy and 
cognitive bloat worry focus the debate on the precise nature of the relationship 
between the internal processes of the cognitive agent and those external entities 
to which the agent is coupled. Heersmink (2015), drawing on previous attempts 
(e.g., Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Sterelny, 2010; Sutton, Harris, Keil, & Barnier, 
2010; Wilson & Clark, 2009), helpfully proposes an 8-dimensional taxonomy to 
map the conceptual space between mere coupling and full-blown constitution. 
The dimensions are:
•  information flow
•  reliability
•  durability
•  trust
•  procedural transparency
•  informational transparency
•  individualization
•  transformation
The idea is that the more highly a coupled system scores along these dimen-
sions, the more tightly integrated the system is, and the stronger is the argument 
for extension. To put it slightly differently, and to foreshadow a bit, high scores 
along these dimensions would indicate that the pathways of influence between the 
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components of a coupled system are roughly symmetrical, balanced, and reciprocal, 
where lower scores would indicate asymmetric, imbalanced, and non-reciprocal 
influence between components. I will return to this point in the next section. In 
less fine-grained but more familiar terms, the space between coupling and consti-
tution has also been described in terms of mere coupling (e.g., Adams & Aizawa, 
2010), embedding (e.g., Rupert, 2004), scaffolding (e.g., Sterelny, 2010), and, of 
course, extending (e.g., Clark, 2008).
However we cut the pie, most seem to agree that in order to make an argu-
ment for cognitive extension, principled criteria are needed to distinguish cases 
of mere coupling from full-blown constitution.3 On Heersmink’s (2015) model, 
for example, extension looks like …
… systems with a high-bandwidth, reciprocal information flow, where the artifact is 
reliably available, the relation between agent and artifact is durable, the information it 
provides is trustworthy, the artifact is procedurally and informationally transparent, 
it is individualized or possibly even entrenched, and its representational systems has 
transformed the brain of its user. (p. 595)
On my telling, this passage and others like it represent the most mature and plau-
sible formulations of the nature of extended cognition. To be sure, this sets the bar 
for extension rather high, and it seems likely that blocking the coupling-constitu-
tion and cognitive bloat objections in this way may come at the cost of conceding 
that Otto’s notebook, for example, is closer to coupling than constitution. That 
question needn’t be settled here, however, as my purpose is only to trace the tra-
jectory of the coupled systems aspect of the extended cognition debate. So to sum 
up, we can tell a story about extended cognition which has its roots in early 20th 
century American philosophy and psychology, develops more fully as a theory 
about coupled systems and then reaches a mature formulation in the context of 
strict, specifiable criteria for extension.
2. Connections
With both narratives now in place, my aim in this second part of the paper is to 
make explicit what I take to be the most important connections between them 
(section 2.1). In order to strengthen these connections, I identify and respond 
to two possible objections to my proposal (section 2.2). I will then go on in sec-
tion 3 to use these connections as the basis for supporting certain formulations 
of extended cognition over others (section 3.1) and identifying promising new 
directions for extended cognition research (section 3.2).
2.1. Agent-environment interactions
Here’s a first pass at the similarities I will use to make my case: we can tell a 
coherent narrative about the development of the person-situation debate and the 
extended cognition debate which begins in both cases with a dichotomy which 
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is eventually eschewed in favor of an interactionist conclusion with a gradient of 
positions in between. The thread that ties these narratives together is the common 
interest in the nature of agents, environments, and their interactions.
In the history of the person-situation debate, the dichotomy is pretty straight-
forward: adherents of the Doctrine of Traits thought individual difference meas-
ures—personality traits that inhered in the agent—were the best way to predict 
and explain behavior. Adherents of the Doctrine of Situationism thought the same 
about environmental and situational influences external to the agent. While it is 
doubtful than few, if any, psychologists were actually staunch adherents of one doc-
trine at the total expense of the other, Kihlstrom (2013) does make a convincing 
case on historical grounds that these doctrines did structure much early research 
in the development of what we now know as social and personality psychology.
In the extended mind and cognition debates, the dichotomy is less stark but still 
apparent. Clark and Chalmers never claimed that all cognitive processes or mental 
states were extended, nor did internalist critics ever claim that features external 
to the brain had no influence on cognition. But still, as Ross and Ladyman (2010) 
point out, Adams and Aizawa’s coupling-constitution fallacy isn’t just pitched as a 
criticism of Clark and Chalmers’s externalism—it is also a defense of internalism 
(p. 155). Much of what is at stake in these debates is the question of what sorts of 
structures and processes ought to figure into cognitive scientific theories, predic-
tions, and explanations. In this sense, much of the early debate surrounding the 
extended mind and cognition did have a rather internalist versus externalist flavor.
As the debate evolved, however, a number of nuanced positions were staked 
out between the poles of internalism and externalism about the mind and cog-
nition. Rob Rupert’s formulation of the hypothesis of embedded cognition4 and 
Kim Sterelny’s formulation of the hypothesis of scaffolded cognition are exem-
plars here. The latter is more germane for present purposes: “the scaffolded mind 
hypothesis proposes that human cognitive capacities both depend on and have 
been transformed by environmental resources. Often these resources have been 
preserved, built or modified precisely because they enhance cognitive capacity” 
(Sterelny, 2010, p. 472). In the framework of traditional internalism or Rupert-
style embedding, the environment is exogenously determined. Cognitive agents 
depend on and learn to exploit external features of their environment, but they 
may not modify those environments in important or systematic ways. Sterelny-
style scaffolding, in contrast, construes the external environment as at least some-
times endogenously determined: it is a partially built environment, and it is often 
engineered to enhance or scaffold our cognitive capacities. This view cuts across 
a simple distinction between internal and external resources in the sense that an 
agent can actively sculpt the environment to determine how and what sorts of 
external entities she can interact with and come to depend on. The reliable pres-
ence of these external entities in turn shapes the internal capacities of the agent in 
new ways, which changes the sorts of external entities she interacts with, and so on.
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY  9
There are a number of analogs in social and personality psychology which sim-
ilarly served to undermine a strict dichotomy between the internalism of person-
ality traits and the externalism of situational influences. Ickes, Snyder, and Garcia 
(1997) review the vast literature in personality psychology which has studied the 
ways in which the active selection of situations can be understood as a function 
of personality. They come to the following conclusion.
That people actively gravitate toward some types of situations and deliberately avoid 
others, and that their choices of situations are reflections of features of their personal 
identities (including such dispositions as attitudes, traits, and conceptions of self), may 
constitute major sources of the regularities, stabilities, and consistencies in behavior 
that are typically regarded as defining characteristics of personality (p. 186).
A significant component of personality, in other words, is the disposition to seek 
out certain kinds of situations (usually situations that are not discrepant with 
one’s self-concept) and avoid others (usually situations that are discrepant with 
one’s self concept). And selecting situations in this way solidifies certain aspects 
of personality, which in turn leads to seeking out and avoiding certain kinds 
of situations, and so on. In much the same way Sterelny talks about cognitive 
scaffolding, a robust literature in personality psychology suggests that people 
can and do actively sculpt the situations they will encounter, and in so doing, 
generate the sorts of consistent behavioral, cognitive, and affective dispositions 
which characterize personality.
The concepts of cognitive scaffolding and situation selection both highlight 
the inadequacy of strict distinctions between agents and environments. As I have 
hinted above, once these inadequacies are noted, a form of interactionism follows 
as the most plausible solution. In the case of the person-situation debate, to cite 
one of many possible examples, this is made quite explicit:
The persistence of this [person-situation] debate into the 21st century is something 
of a mystery. Since at least the 1930s, deep thinkers as diverse as Allport (1937) and 
Lewin (1951) have argued that invidious comparisons miss the point because behavior 
is a function of an interaction between the person and the situation. By the 1980s this 
recognition had deteriorated into a truism. Nowadays, everybody is an interactionist. 
(Funder, 2006, p. 22)
In the philosophy of mind, the language might not be as explicit, nor the conclu-
sion as widespread. But Palermos (2014), borrowing terminology from Dynamical 
Systems Theory, makes a strong case for adopting necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for (cognitive) extension which have an unmistakable interactionist ring.
In cases where two nonautonomous systems mutually interact on the basis of feedback 
loops, there is an ongoing causal amalgam between the two units that disallows their 
decomposition into two separate systems on the basis of distinct inputs and outputs … 
The reason is that the way each component is affected is not exogenous to the compo-
nent itself, and so cannot be properly thought of as its input. Likewise, the way each 
component affects the other is directly and synchronically related to the component to 
be affected and so cannot be properly conceptualized as output of the affecting compo-
nent … We can call this the “ongoing feedback loops” argument for the (ontological) 
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postulation of coupled systems … In other words, ongoing mutual interdependence 
on the basis of feedback loops is the criterion by which we can judge whether two 
seemingly distinct systems constitute an overall system, consisting of both of them. 
(pp. 33–34)
This notion of mutual interdependence on the basis of ongoing feedback loops 
is the crux of my account of interactionism. I take Palermos to be asserting that 
(among other things) component X must be able to affect component Y in roughly 
the same way as component Y can affect component X in order for X and Y to 
constitute an extended coupled system. And I take it that Heersmink (2015) has 
something similar in mind, especially with respect to the dimensions of reciprocal 
information flow and mutual transformation noted above, both of which seem to 
require the kind of bi-directionality emphasized by Palermos. Huebner’s (2016, p. 
52) distinction between exploitation and collaboration is also in this same spirit. 
What ties all of these proposals together, I submit, is an emphasis on inter-action 
in a strict sense, characterized by symmetry, balance, and reciprocity of the path-
ways of influence between components of the coupled system.5 This shared sense of 
interactionism underwrites what I take to be the most plausible formulations of 
extended cognition.
By highlighting the similarities in the evolution of the person-situation and 
extended cognition debates, from their beginnings in terms of a dichotomy 
(Doctrine of Traits versus Doctrine of Situationism and Internalism versus 
Externalism), through the development of a gradient in between (situation selec-
tion as personality trait and cognitive scaffolding), to a proposed resolution in 
terms of interactionism (“nowadays, everyone is an interactionist” and the ongoing 
feedback loops criterion, etc.), I hope to have made the case that there are indeed 
important and instructive parallels between the development of social and person-
ality psychology and the extended cognition research program. In what follows, 
I’ll advance some positive arguments that I think follow from this. But first, I’ll 
consider two objections to the connection I have drawn here.
2.2. Objections
The first and most formidable objection is that an old debate about the explana-
tion and prediction of behavior is orthogonal to a contemporary debate about the 
nature of cognitive processes. Relatedly, one might also object that the sort of inter-
nalism and externalism represented by the Doctrines of Traits and Situationism 
is disanalogous to the debates about extended cognition—that the relation of the 
person to the situation is different in kind from the relationship of, say, Otto to 
his notebook. If these objections are on the right track, then the resolution of the 
person-situation debate wouldn’t tell us anything about the extended cognition 
debate. I’ll try to show that this isn’t the case.
Regarding the first objection that the two debates are orthogonal, it should 
be pointed out that a number of philosophers have already begun to make a 
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY  11
connection between social and personality psychology and the extended mind 
and cognition debates. The connection has largely been drawn in the context of 
the so-called situationist challenges to virtue theory.6 Doris, one the pioneers of 
the situationist challenge to virtue ethics, briefly addresses the extended cognition 
debate in his (2015) book which seeks to sort out the implications of a wide range 
of psychological research for philosophical theories of agency, reflection, and 
responsibility. In discussing the possibility of transactive memory in long-term 
romantic partners (more on this below), Doris refers to the extended cognition 
debate to stake out his position. He ultimately thinks that transactive memory 
can be explained in the framework of Rupert-style embedding rather than Clark 
and Chalmers-style extension (pp. 190–192). But the use of concepts from the 
extended cognition debate in interpreting social psychological research is, I think, 
indicative of an important connection between the two.
More substantively, Alfano and Skorburg (2016) explicitly argue that extended 
mind-style arguments could offer a response to the situationist challenges to moral 
and intellectual character:
If those mental states are sometimes extended, perhaps the dispositions to have them 
are too. Presumably, the dispositions don’t extend in every case, just as the states don’t 
extend in every case. Perhaps some people are honest all on their own. Perhaps some 
people are intelligent all on their own. But if our suggestion is on the right track, in 
some cases, a person is honest because (among other things) she is suitably integrated 
with props, tools, or other people outwith her brain and body. Likewise, if our sugges-
tion is on the right track, in some cases, a person is intelligent because (among other 
things) he is suitably integrated with props, tools, or other people outwith his brain 
and body. (p. 2)
Howell (2016) makes a similar argument, drawing on situationist social psychol-
ogy and the extended mind debate to make an argument against what he calls 
traditional “skindividualism” and in favor of something like extended virtues. 
Without venturing further into the weeds of the situationist challenges to vir-
tue theory, the fact that these thinkers have identified a range of resources in 
the extended mind and cognition literatures to bring to bear on aspects of the 
person-situation debate, and vice versa, tells against the objection that the two 
debates are orthogonal. Connections have already been made between them and 
in this paper, I’m trying to draw these connections out more explicitly and in 
new directions.
Regarding the second objection—that persons don’t extend to situations in 
the same way that agents extend to their artifacts—I concede that this is, strictly 
speaking, true. But I am arguing by analogy here and no analogy is perfect. All I 
need to show is that the argumentative moves in these debates are similar enough 
that one might profitably inform the other. To that end, I would point out that 
Lewin himself does claim that the situation includes the person and is not separate 
from it. This is not obviously a constitution claim, but it is not so foreign to claims 
made by friends of extended cognition, either: “the psychological environment has 
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to be regarded functionally as a part of one interdependent field, the life space, the 
other part of which is the person” (Lewin, 1939/1951, p. 140, quoted in Kihlstrom, 
2013, p. 794). Kihlstrom goes on to elucidate Lewin’s view as being that, “persons 
are part of the situation to which they respond—or, put another way, that persons 
and situations together constitute a unified field in which behavior takes place” 
(pp. 795–796, emphasis in original).
For Lewin, at the level of behavior, there is no strict distinction between persons 
and situations. On this view, it then makes sense to say—recalling Clark—that 
behavior is the result of an inextricable tangle of feedback and feedforward loops, 
promiscuously crisscrossing the boundaries of persons and situations. Seen in this 
light, Clark and Chalmers’s claim that “there is nothing sacred about skull and 
skin” (1998, p. 14) looks like old Lewinian field theory wine in new functionalist 
bottles. In (roughly) the same way that internal personality traits and external 
situational influences can conspire to produce behavior, so too can internal neural 
resources and external scaffolds conspire to produce cognition.
The interchangeability of the argument forms from the person-situation and 
extended cognition debates suggest that, far from being disanalogous, the two 
can actually inform one another. Not only can the terms from the debates about 
extended cognition help to clarify the person-situation debate (e.g., Doctrine of 
Traits as internalism, Doctrine of Situationism as externalism, situation selection 
as scaffolding, etc.), but the terms from the resolution of the person-situation 
debate (e.g., “nowadays, everyone is an interactionist”), can—or so I will argue 
below—help to resolve debates about extended cognition.
Summing up, my claim here is not that there is perfect correspondence between 
the person-situation and extended cognition debates. There isn’t. What I hope to 
show, however, is that while old debates about the prediction and explanation of 
behavior may seem unrelated to contemporary debates about the nature of cog-
nitive processes, there are in fact important and illustrative similarities between 
them, and a number of thinkers have already begun to connect these dots. Thus, 
the need for a detailed and explicit account of the connections between them—
precisely what I aimed to give in this section—is all the more apparent. And given 
these connections, an account of the entailments and repercussions is also needed. 
That is my task for the balance of the paper.
3. Implications and new directions
If my narratives in section 1 were coherent and if my case for the connections 
between them in section 2 holds, I take it that there are important and instructive 
parallels between some aspects of social and personality psychology and some 
aspects of the extended cognition debate. In this final section, I examine what 
follows from this connection. I will argue that if my comparison holds, then inter-
actionist conceptions of extended cognition ought to be favored over less interac-
tionist alternatives (section 3.2). I will then argue, somewhat independently, that 
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contemporary research in social and personality psychology provides the most 
plausible direction for the future of extended cognition research (section 3.2).
3.1. Implications
Sutton (2010) identifies the first wave of extended mind arguments as committed 
to the parity principle, where the second wave is characterized by a commitment 
to the complementarity principle.7 It is an open question what constitutes the 
third wave, but Shaun Gallagher’s (2013) “Socially Extended Mind” seems a good 
candidate, as it pushes extended mind and cognition arguments in a new direction 
and has generated a number of responses in doing so.8 I agree with the letter of 
Gallagher’s proposal: the social domain is the new frontier for extended cognition. 
I disagree, however, with the operationalization of the socially extended mind in 
terms of mental institutions (e.g., Gallagher & Cristafi, 2009). Gallagher’s proposal 
is that mental institutions “like legal systems, research practices, and cultural 
institutions” (2013, p. 6) offer the best prospects for the socially extended mind.
The first positive argument I want to make is that in roughly the same way 
that the person-situation debate is resolved in terms of interactionism, so too, 
ought the extended cognition debate be resolved in terms of interactionism.9 
More specifically, we ought to give pride of place to proposals like Palermos’s 
(2014) ongoing feedback loops criterion, or Heersmink’s (2015) dimensions of 
reciprocal information flow and mutual transformation, which emphasize the 
symmetric, balanced, and reciprocal pathways of influence between components 
of coupled systems. On these interactionist views, a number of problems arise 
with Gallagher’s formulation of the socially extended mind. First, the distinctions 
(and hence, the standards of evaluation) are blurred between HEM and HEC. 
More substantively, though, none of the examples Gallagher invokes meet the 
interactionist standards of symmetry, balance, and reciprocity. It is hard to see, 
for example, how a paralegal assistant could exert the same kind of influence on 
decades of legal precedent as the precedents exert on them. That is, the pathways 
of influence between the paralegal and the law are probably best described as 
asymmetric. Perhaps we could charitably grant that the relationship is symmetric 
and imbalanced, but in any case, we are nowhere near reciprocity—one of the 
hallmarks of interactionism. And things don’t look any better for Gallagher’s even 
more nebulous examples of research practices and cultural institutions.
As I mentioned in section 2.2, adopting something like the ongoing feedback 
loops criterion comes at the cost of relegating some putative cases of extended 
cognition to the framework of embedding. I agree, then, with Huebner’s (2013) 
assessment that Gallagher’s formulation of the socially extended mind is more 
accurately rendered as the socially embedded mind in just this way. This is not to 
say that the socially extended mind isn’t important in its own right, but rather, that 
it does not offer a plausible path forward for extended (as opposed to embedded 
or scaffolded) cognition research. Insofar as something like the interactionism 
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represented by the ongoing feedback loops criterion sets the bar, then Gallagher’s 
socially extended mind will fall short.
The next question to ask, of course, is whether the criteria on offer are too 
restrictive. What does get over the bar? Palermos (2014) makes a case that tactile 
visual substitution systems (TVSS) are strong candidates for extension.10 While 
TVSS probably does pass muster, I think it is probably closer to the exception 
than the rule, and this brings me to the next phase of my positive argument. If 
we take seriously the interactionist lessons from the person-situation debate, then 
the standard agent-artifact paradigm (e.g., Otto and his notebook or Dave and 
his iPhone), operative in nearly all accounts of the extended mind and cogni-
tion, may be called into question. My claim—and here I possibly part ways with 
Palermos—is that once we take seriously the sort of interactionism I’ve described, 
many agent-artifact systems will not reliably exhibit the right kind of bi-direc-
tional, reciprocal feedback necessary for extension, at least not as reliably as many 
agent-agent systems will.11 The most important connection, then, between the 
extended cognition debate and the person-situation debate is the striking similar-
ity between the interactionism exemplified in proposals like the ongoing feedback 
loops criterion and some models of social interaction from the history of social 
and personality psychology. Consider Darley and Fazio’s (1980) model of the 
social interaction sequence:
(1) Either because of past observations of the other or because of the categories into 
which he or she has encoded the other, a perceiver develops a set of expectancies about 
a target person. (2) The perceiver then acts toward the target person in a way that is 
in accord with his or her expectations of the target person. (3) Next, the target inter-
prets the meaning of the perceiver’s action. (4) Based on the interpretation, the target 
responds to the perceiver’s action, and (5) the perceiver interprets the target’s action. 
At this point, the perceiver again acts toward the target person and so can be regarded 
as reentering the interaction sequence loop at Step 2 … (6) After acting toward the 
perceiver, the target person interprets the meaning of his or her own action. (p. 868)12
Kihlstrom (2013) describes this process—more accurately, I think—as a cycle of 
social interaction rather than a sequence (p. 787). Similar accounts can be found 
in Cantor and Kihlstrom (1987) and Jones (1986). It is important to note that 
these models are all elaborated in the context of research on expectancy confir-
mation effects, more colloquially known as self-fulfilling prophecies. My claim 
is that the interactions modeled in this research program will reliably exemplify 
the sort of feedback described by Palermos (2014), Heersmink (2015), Huebner 
(2016), and others.
In narrative form, the idea is this: I think of you as an honest person because, 
among other things, I’ve seen you behave honestly in the past. As we’re walking 
down the street today, a stranger in front of us drops a $100 bill from her pocket. 
I might (consciously or unconsciously) signal my expectation of your honesty—a 
quick glance at you, then at the stranger in front of us, then back at you. You 
might then interpret my glance as my expecting you to flag down the stranger 
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and return the bill. And you might do just that. If you do, my expectations of you 
are confirmed and even strengthened: “You really are a genuinely honest person,” 
I might say. In turn, you might think to yourself, “It’s true, I really am an honest 
person.” The next time we’re in a similar situation, my expectations will be even 
stronger, and perhaps you’ll be even more likely to do something similarly hon-
est. Perhaps you’ll even be more likely to do so when I’m not there signaling my 
expectations to you.13
The ping-ponging between my expectations and subsequent signaling, your 
interpretation of them and subsequent behavior, my interpretation of your behav-
ior and subsequent updating of my expectations, and so on, is paradigmatic of 
Palermos’s idea of “ongoing mutual interdependence on the basis of feedback 
loops (2014, pp. 33–34)” and Heersmink’s requirement of reciprocal information 
flow. This kind of bi-directional, mutual interdependence is at the core of many 
kinds of social interactions, and for this reason, offers the most plausible paradigm 
for thinking about extension in terms of interactionism. Put another way, other 
agents are more likely than (many) artifacts to exhibit the required kind of time 
sensitive, reliable, and reciprocal influence.
3.2. New directions
The second point that follows from the connection I’ve drawn is related to the 
first, but can, I think, ultimately be decoupled from it. This second claim is that 
recent research in social and personality psychology—especially research on close 
relationships—offers a promising route for developing the next wave(s) of the 
extended mind and cognition research programs. If my argument for interac-
tionism in section 3.1 went through, then this point should follow very naturally. 
If agent-agent systems are a better way to think about extended cognition-style 
arguments in light of Palermos (2014), Heersmink (2015), and others, then the 
disciplines that study agent-agent couplings would seem well-equipped for the 
task. In this section, I’ll try to show how some research programs in social and 
personality psychology do just this. But even if the argument from the previous 
section falls short, my claims in this section about the potentially shared resources 
between social and personality psychology and extended cognition need not fall 
with it.
I want to begin by noting that the proposal I’m making is already, in a sense, 
underway with respect to the recent interest in Transactive Memory Systems 
(TMS) among friends of extended cognition (e.g., Harris, Keil, Sutton, Barnier, 
& McIlwain, 2011; Huebner, 2016; Kirchhoff, 2015; Sutton et al., 2010; Theiner, 
2013; Tollefsen, Dale, & Paxton, 2013).
The concept of a Transactive Memory System is due to a series of papers by 
Dan Wegner and colleagues (e.g., Wegner, 1986, 1995; Wegner, Giuliano, & Hertel, 
1985).14 Perhaps the most well-known is Wegner, Erber, and Raymond’s (1991) 
“Transactive Memory in Close Relationships” which, it should be noted, was 
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published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Therein, TMS is 
described as follows:
People in close relationships know many things about each other’s memories … Such 
knowledge of one another’s memory areas takes time and practice to develop, but the 
result is that close couples have an implicit structure for carrying out the pair’s mem-
ory tasks. With this structure in place, couples in close relationships have a transactive 
memory that is greater than either of their individual memories. Transactive memory 
is a shared system for encoding, storing, and retrieving information. (p. 923)
This is low-hanging fruit for the extended cognition theorist. Here we have a claim 
(with empirical evidence, to boot) that the cognitive processes of remembering, 
recollecting, cueing, and so on can be realized between two individuals in a roman-
tic relationship. The findings of the paper are indeed compelling. Romantic part-
ners without an assigned structure (e.g., one partner is told remember items from 
categories 1 and 2, the other partner, 3 and 4) exhibited significantly more agree-
ment about which partner was more expert in a given category (M = 5.52) than 
randomly assigned impromptu partners (M = 4.04) and romantic partners recalled 
significantly more items (M = 31.4) than did impromptu partners (M = 27.64).
I don’t mean to imply that this is a knockdown argument for extended cogni-
tion, but the “communication and updating of information each has about the 
areas of the other’s knowledge,” and its outcome that “each partner cultivates the 
other as an external memory aid” (p. 924) smacks of the kind of interactionism 
I’ve been pushing in this paper. Perhaps the most surprising result from these 
studies is that that when structures were assigned to the partners, not only did 
the effects just described disappear, they actually flipped: romantic partners with 
an assigned structure recalled significantly fewer items (M  =  23.75) than did 
impromptu partners (M = 30.14). In these cases, there seems to be something 
quite important about each partner cultivating and being cultivated by the other, 
that is, knowing what the other knows and knowing that they know that you 
know it. It is no surprise, I want to say, that extended cognition proponents can 
get mileage out of these kinds of studies: TMS seems, on the face of it, to meet 
even the strictest standards of interactionism.15
At the very least, TMS seems to provide a better lodestone for extended cog-
nition theories than Otto’s notebook. Indeed, construing TMS as a shared system 
for encoding, storing, and retrieving information provides an empirically tracta-
ble (and thus, HEC friendly) framework which avoids many of the persistent 
objections to HEM.16 More ambitiously though, this body of research offers a 
springboard into research in social and personality psychology for the next wave 
of the extended mind and cognition. One upshot of the recent interest in TMS, I 
hope, will be an increased awareness of the robust literature in personality psy-
chology on romantic partnerships beyond TMS-type cases. This seems to me the 
most promising arena for interactionist, agent-agent conceptions of extended 
cognition. In the spirit of advancing the extended cognition research programs 
in new directions, however, theorists need not be confined to classic cognitive 
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processes like memory and problem solving, though there is plenty to consider 
here too. An exciting but underexplored area involves the process of attribution 
in close relationships. For example, a study by Srivastava, McGonigal, Richards, 
Butler, and Gross (2006) shows how trait-optimism—the disposition to expect 
positive outcomes—makes positive outcomes like satisfaction, feeling supported, 
and resolving conflicts more likely in romantic relationships. Relatedly, there is 
a large body of literature about the role of positive illusions in relationships (e.g., 
Martz et al., 1998; Murray & Holmes, 1997; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996a, 
1996b) which is very much in-line with the self-fulfilling prophecy paradigm cited 
above as an exemplar of interactionism.17
These are but a few examples from a much larger body of work which offers 
one of the most promising future directions for the extended cognition research 
program. This much should still hold true, even if the arguments from section 2 
and section 3.1 fail. But if the arguments up to this point are on the right track, 
social and personality psychology in general—and research on romantic partner-
ships in particular—is well-positioned to contribute to a robustly interactionist 
theory of extended cognition. Setting all of that argumentation to one side, I also 
straightforwardly agree with Doris that “there’s something sweet about saying 
that the members of a devoted couple are literally part of one another” (2015, 
pp. 191–192).
Conclusion
The literature surrounding the situationist challenges to virtue theory played a 
large role in opening the doors for philosophers to engage with social and per-
sonality psychologists. As I hinted at in section 2.2, the extended cognition debate 
has also begun to enter this fray. If this paper has succeeded in its aims, then it 
will have opened similar doors, and perhaps even nudged some to go through.
To sum up and conclude: I tried to highlight instructive parallels between the 
person-situation debate in social and personality psychology and the extended 
cognition debate in the philosophy of mind. I argued that the resolution of the 
former in terms of interactionism lends support for the analogously interactionist 
formulations of extended cognition proposed by Palermos (2014), Heersmink 
(2015), and others. I then argued that in this interactionist framework, the most 
plausible cases of extension might not be agent-artifact couplings like Otto and 
his notebook or Dave and his iPhone, but rather, agent-agent couplings such 
as transactive memory systems in romantic partnerships. If this is right, then 
social and personality psychology—the discipline(s) that developed from the per-
son-situation debate—represent a whole new range of empirical considerations 
for extended mind and cognition theorists.
These new considerations, I suspect, may take us away from a sometimes overly 
narrow focus on extended cognitive processes, and bring us closer to an often 
overlooked aspect of Clark and Chalmers’s original vision: “far better to take the 
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broader view, and see agents themselves as spread into the world” (1998, p. 18, 
emphasis added).18
Notes
1.  But if not, here’s a brief recap: Inga’s biological memory is perfectly intact. She hears 
about an exhibit she’d like to see at the Museum of Modern Art. She recalls that the 
MoMA is on 53rd St., and so walks to 53rd and goes to see the art exhibit. Otto suffers 
from Alzheimer’s, and so he carries a notebook with him everywhere he goes, writing 
down those things that folks like Inga would normally commit to biological memory. 
Otto, too, hears about the art exhibit and also wants to see it. So Otto consults his 
notebook and finds that the MoMA is on 53rd, and then walks to 53rd and goes 
to see the art exhibit. “In relevant respects,” according to Clark and Chalmers, “the 
cases are entirely analogous: the notebook plays for Otto the same role that memory 
plays for Inga. The information in the notebook functions just like the information 
constituting an ordinary non-occurrent belief; it just happens that this information 
lies beyond the skin” (1998, pp. 12–13).
2.  But if not, here’s their formulation: “When Clark makes an object cognitive when 
it is connected to a cognitive agent, he is committing an instance of a coupling-
constitution fallacy. This is the most common mistake that extended mind theorists 
make. The fallacious pattern is to draw attention to cases, real or imagined, in which 
some object or process is coupled in some fashion to some cognitive agent. From this, 
one slides to the conclusion that the object or process constitutes part of the agent’s 
cognitive apparatus or cognitive processing … Yet coupling relations are distinct from 
constitutive relations, and the fact that object or process X is coupled to object or 
process Y does not entail that X is part of Y” (Adams & Aizawa, 2010, pp. 67–68).
3.  However, Hurley (2010) and Ross and Ladyman (2010) argue (in different ways) that 
the distinction between coupling and constitution is a specious one.
4.  The hypothesis is that “cognitive processes depend very heavily, in hitherto unexpected 
ways, on organismically external props and devices and on the structure of the 
environment in which cognition takes place” (Rupert, 2004, p. 393). Rupert concedes 
that external entities might be more important for cognitive scientific explanations 
than we would have thought—cognition might depend on them in interesting ways. 
Rupert denies, however that these props, devices, and structures are constitutive of 
cognitive processes. If the framework of embedding can account for the same range 
of cases as extension without the dubious inference from coupling to causation, the 
argument goes, then ceteris paribus we should endorse the hypothesis of embedded 
cognition over the hypothesis of extended cognition by “the methodological principle 
of conservatism” (p. 395).
5.  It would take us too far afield here to exhaustively map the logical space of these 
dimensions, but here’s a start: to recall a terrible example from Adams and Aizawa 
(2010, p. 67) the mathematician-and-pencil coupled system exhibits asymmetry 
because the pencil could never influence the mathematician to the degree that the 
mathematician could influence the pencil. In this sense, all asymmetric coupled 
systems also exhibit imbalance in the pathways of influence between components 
and are therefore also not reciprocal. An example of a symmetric but imbalanced 
coupled system might be illustrated by something like Twitter trends. In principle, 
all Twitter users exert some influence on what is trending, and so the pathways of 
influence are (or are at least potentially) symmetric. But what Katy Perry tweets (with 
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some 91  million followers as of this writing) has significantly more influence on 
Twitter trends than what I tweet (with my few dozen followers). Thus, there is an 
imbalance in the pathways of influence between components, and so no reciprocity. 
Lastly, symmetric, balanced, and therefore, reciprocal coupled systems are perhaps 
realized by the Tactile Visual Substitution Systems described by Palermos (2014, see 
note 11 below), but, as I will argue below, are more reliably realized by agent-agent 
coupled systems, such as long-term romantic partners. At any rate, these distinctions 
are simply meant to help clarify the notion of interaction on offer by synthesizing 
trends in recent scholarship. Future research should assess the degree to which they 
square with more entrenched distinctions in the literature (e.g., between embedding, 
scaffolding, etc.). Thanks to Mark Alfano for helping to develop these criteria.
6.  In a sentence: the evidence from situationist social psychology, such as Darley and 
Latane’s (1968) bystander studies, Darley and Batson’s (1973) Good Samaritan 
studies, and Milgram’s (1974) obedience studies, challenges the existence of the 
stable, consistent character traits countenanced by (neo)Aristotlean virtue ethics. See 
Doris (2002) and Alfano (2012) for detailed, book length treatments.
7.  Here’s Sutton’s gloss on the Parity Principle: “first-wave EM [extended mind] is 
based on the parity principle: cognitive states and processes extend beyond the brain 
and into the (external) world when the relevant parts of the world function in the 
same way as do unquestionably cognitive processes in the head” (2010, p. 193). And 
the Complementarity Principle: “second-wave EM is based on a complementarity 
principle: in extended cognitive systems, external states and processes need not 
mimic or replicate the formats, dynamics, or functions of inner states and processes. 
Rather, different components of the overall (enduring or temporary) system can play 
quite different roles and have different properties while coupling in collective and 
complementary contributions to flexible thinking and acting” (p. 194).
8.  The journal Cognitive Systems Research dedicated a special edition (Nos. 25–26) to 
Gallagher’s formulation of the socially extended mind.
9.  What I am proposing is close in spirit to Menary’s (2007) notion of cognitive 
integration, but Menary’s account lacks the sort of specific, detailed criteria offered by 
Heersmink (2015) or Palermos (2014).
10.  Here’s Palermos’s take: “the mutual interaction between the agent and his tactile visual 
substitution system gives rise to new systemic properties (such as the new quasi-visual 
experiences produced, or new possibilities for interaction with the environment) 
that do not belong to any of the subsystems alone, but to the overall coupled system, 
ATVSS [Agent-Tactile Visual Substitution System] … the postulation of coupled 
systems is necessary with respect to the explanation of certain systemic properties, 
which we would otherwise be at a loss how to account for” (p. 32).
11.  To be perfectly clear, I think that many agent-artifact couplings do, in fact, make the 
cut now, and given the advance of interactive computational technologies, it is highly 
likely that many more will in the near future. My claim is simply that the dynamics of 
social interactions that exhibit the relevant characteristics (e.g., reciprocity) are more 
widespread and reliably realized. After all, TVSS and related technologies are often 
prohibitively expensive and not widely available. By comparison, the expectancy 
effects I discuss below are ubiquitous, especially in the context of friendships, romantic 
partnerships, and other close relationships. I don’t think this claim contradicts the 
spirit of the proposals of Palermos, Heersmink, or Huebner. Rather, it should be seen 
as expanding their reach by showing how cognition can be extended not only by 
props and tools, but also by other people.
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12.  It’s worth noting here that Darley and Fazio identify symbolic interactionism as the 
precursor to this model, and it is for this reason I think it is important to consider 
the role of the classical pragmatists like Dewey and Mead in the development of the 
extended mind and cognition. For more on the relationship between the “Chicago 
School” pragmatists and the extended mind, see Madzia (2013).
13.  This vignette is just a quick adaptation of Alfano’s (2012) notion of a factitious virtue.
14.  For helpful reviews of TMS research, see Lewis and Herndon (2011) and Ren and 
Argote (2011).
15.  But see Huebner (2016) for a nuanced discussion of which parts of TMS fit into which 
parts of the extended mind and cognition debate.
16.  Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this additional upshot of my 
argument.
17.  Of particular interest in this body of research on romantic partnership is the “Actor 
Partner Interdependence Model” (APIM) (e.g., Cook & Kenny, 2005; Kashy & Kenny, 
1999; Kenny, 1996). This model is employed in research on dyads (such as married 
couples or parent–child relationships) to conceptually and statistically account for 
both effects of individual actors and effects of the dyad as a single unit. The notion 
of interdependence in these models provides one plausible route for operationalizing 
the concept of interaction discussed in this paper.
18.  Many thanks are due to two anonymous referees whose careful and critical feedback 
improved my arguments. I am also indebted to Mark Alfano, Nicolae Morar, and 
Mark Johnson for helpful conversations while developing this paper.
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